The transatlantic relationship
will never again be what it was during the Cold War and indeed it would
be pointless to try and recreate the closeness of the transatlantic
relationship as it was at the time. This is the most striking finding to
emerge from the commission’s work.
Despite this, the necessity for
a strong link between Europe and the United States is no less pressing,
against a background of ever-increasing and unpredictable threats. This
is the second main finding emerging from the analysis of the
relationship between Europe and the United States: it is in the
interests of both partners to preserve a strong transatlantic link, or
risk becoming ineffectual, or even impotent, when solutions to major
international problems are being sought.
I – THE
TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP is
AT A TURNING POINT IN ITS HISTORY
If Franco-American relations
have always been chiefly characterised by a long history of friendship,
they have also been marked by frequent tensions of varying severity. The
same holds true for the majority of our European neighbours, to such an
extent that one might say that transatlantic tensions are an integral
part of relations between the majority of European countries and the
United States. We should not need to be reminded that from the very
dawn of its history, the United States has consistently seen itself, and
sought to construct itself, as an alternative to Europe and not as an
extension of that continent. Until their involvement in World War II in
1941, the United States lived as if it were a non-European nation, which
was not inappropriate considering how its original population consisted
of people who no longer wished to live in Europe, or had had to leave
it.
The Soviet threat did not put an
end to the tensions, but it did succeed in forging unprecedented levels
of unity and solidarity between Western Europe and the United States.
The countries of Western Europe needed the US to protect them, while
America needed Europe as a buffer against communism.
The fall of the Berlin Wall
marked the end of this unique period in the history of the relationship
between Europe and the United States. Today we ask: what is the new
definition of the transatlantic relationship in the absence of the
Soviet threat, given that international terrorism does not have the same
power to unify as the USSR nuclear arsenal? Are we to return to the
pre-1941 pattern of an America which held itself aloof from foreign
affairs unless they directly impinged on its national interests?
a. – how
europe lost its strategic importance for the united states : a unanimous
finding
In 2003 the Franco-American
relationship experienced one of the most acute crises of its history.
Even if the exchanges were more muted, Germany and the United States
also went through a period of tension, while, in the great majority of
other European countries, it was only within one section of public
opinion that voices were raised against the transatlantic relationship.
Thrown into sharp relief by America’s military intervention in Iraq,
this crisis, which manifested itself in different ways depending on the
country concerned, was in reality inevitable once the soviet threat no
longer existed, for this threat shaped and defined the form and content
of relations between Europe and the United States during the Cold War.
The Balkan wars of the 1990’s
may have given the false impression that American security interests
were still first and foremost anchored in Europe, that Europe still held
the front line in the question of security and international stability.
The September 11, 2001 attacks had killed off the illusion of a
transatlantic relationship surviving unchanged since the Cold War. The
status quo, which had endured in transatlantic relations since the fall
of the Berlin Wall, was shattered; the existence of a direct threat to
the United States reawakened unilateralist tendencies already at work
there and which had in fact dominated American foreign policy before
1941. The September 11, 2001 attacks also buried the concept of the
strategic primacy of the continent of Europe – in the new America that
has declared war on international terrorism in central Asia and in the
Middle East today, and may do the same somewhere else tomorrow, Europe
is now just another front line.
The Iraq crisis provides the
most convincing illustration of this finding. It has in fact shown that
some of the staunchest Cold War allies could hold radically different
views on ways of solving contemporary international problems, and not be
afraid to show them. The Iraq crisis thus exposed the rupture of the
close connection between American national interests and those of some
Europeans, the first group considering that the Iraq intervention fell
within the scope of legitimate defence and the protection of their vital
interests, the second having for the most part reasoned that their
interests were best served by seeking a diplomatic solution to the
crisis and that in any case, they had no obligation to fall into line
with the American position.
All in all, we are witnessing a
double “disconnection” since the end of the Cold War:
– In
the first place, there is no longer an automatic connection between
European security and US intervention: during the Cold War, a crisis
within Europe had consequences internationally and directly affected
American interests. These days however, crises within Europe, such as
the conflicts which shook the Balkans during the last decade, are part
of a regional problem, and do not automatically affect the United
States. Certainly the US did intervene, somewhat late in the day, in
Bosnia, and at the beginning of the Kosovo crisis : realistically
however, it has to be said that it is more a question of the inability
of Europeans to deal with these situations on their own, rather than the
interests of the United States, that prompts US intervention.
– In
the second place, crises affecting American national interests no longer
automatically entail the support and participation of the European
states through NATO. When on September 11, 2001 the NATO European
states unanimously proposed activating the mutual assistance clause in
the Foundation Treaty of the Atlantic Alliance, the United States
refused this offer. That the United States, although cut to the heart,
and considering itself moreover to be on a war footing, should refuse
the activation of article V of the Foundation Treaty of the Atlantic
Alliance
the principle of collective defence which is the historic raison
d’être of the creation of the Alliance, and which had not yet been
invoked, is deeply symbolic of how transatlantic relations have changed
since the end of the Cold War.
The truth is that NATO no longer
occupies a central place in the organisation of American forces: now it
is a case of: “the mission makes the coalition”, to borrow
Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld’s elegant phrase, neatly indicating
to the European allies that calling on NATO, a key element of the
European security apparatus, is now just one option among many for the
Americans. Through this redefinition of the role of the Atlantic
Alliance on the American strategic scene, the entire transatlantic
contract is called into question.
During the Cold War, the
contract at the heart of the transatlantic relationship was clear: faced
with the Soviet menace, the states of Europe united to place themselves
under the protection of America. Hence the dual process of establishing
a military alliance, intended to guarantee the collective security of
what was then the “free world”, and an economic and commercial union of
Europe, with the military dimension stemming exclusively from the
transatlantic connection. In brief, to combat the Soviet menace, an
alliance of survival was established, founded on the principle of
solidarity at any price. This is not to say that there were no
transatlantic crises – who can forget the tension between France and the
US after General de Gaulle’s decision to take France out of the
integrated military structure? – but they never went so far as to
question the necessity for the closest possible alliance. What is more,
NATO remained, for the US as for the majority of our European partners,
the central point of reference on security matters, as well as the only
significant cultural and operational template in the military field.
Now the alliance between Europe,
the United States and Canada is one of choice – a change symbolised by
America’s “à la carte” use of NATO. They see this approach as justified
by the new threats facing them: instead of the single threat presented
by the former Soviet Union – which concentrated the mind - they are now
facing multiple threats, not all of them emanating from states, which do
not lend themselves to the classic approach of geographically limited
permanent alliances. Thus, just as there is no longer one particular
threat, nor one strategic issue endangering American dominance and
security, so there is no longer a single framework for action. To put it
another way, faced by security challenges which are mainly outside
Europe – international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, conflict in the Middle East, energy security, the emergence
of China –, the unity of the Atlantic Alliance and of Europe no longer
holds a permanent strategic interest for the United States. On the
contrary, the nature and content of transatlantic relationships will be
increasingly determined by these largely extra-European problems.
The two major strategic events
of the post-Cold War period, the Gulf Wars and the September 11, 2001
attacks, were instrumental in bringing about a change of direction in
American strategy. Today, America’s organisational and strategic choices
are determined on the one hand by the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and their delivery systems, and on the other by
international Islamic terrorism. In this new perspective, Europe is no
longer a priority – the Middle East and Central and Southern Asia are
now much more strategically significant.
As pointed out by Mr. Bruno
Tertrais, senior fellow at the Foundation for Strategic Research, the
Middle East contains the vast majority of strategic problems considered
pre-eminent in terms of American security interests. In addition, it is
the home of three of the four states identified as unstable by the US:
Iraq, Iran, and Syria. The fourth is North Korea.
In a wider context, from an
American perspective, international stability now hinges on Asia. The
Asian continent brings together a number of US security priorities:
– First, the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction.
Indeed, the Asian continent
offers an unprecedented scenario with the co-existence of China, an
official nuclear state, recognised by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), currently engaged in upgrading its arsenal, two
de facto nuclear States, India and Pakistan, who have not signed the
NPT, North Korea, an openly nuclear State which claims to have withdrawn
from the NPT, and Iran, where there are a number of indications that
they are seeking to obtain atomic weapons. A real nuclear arc is taking
shape in the region, complicated by the fact that India and Pakistan and
India and China are involved in border conflicts.
– Next, international terrorism
Let us not forget that the Al
Qaida network originated in Asia. If the Afghanistan operations of
October 2001 ended the protection afforded to this terrorist network by
the Taliban regime, the Asian continent still gives shelter to many
terrorist groups linked to Al Qaida, including its founder. The
Philippines, Indonesia and Pakistan are particularly implicated.
– The Taiwan question.
Taiwan remains a crucial issue
for the United States, especially in the American Congress where
Taiwanese interests are very well represented. The recent transatlantic
debate on the plan to lift the European Union embargo on arms sales to
China was a reminder, if one were necessary, of the importance of the
Taiwanese question in the United States.
Crucially, US interest in Asia
hinges on the presence there of the one country capable of setting
itself up as a rival to the United States in the long term – will it
become a strategic rival, possibly even anti-American, or an economic
power transformed into a giant version of Hong Kong by international
investment? – this is a compelling question.
The China threat, which faded
away at the end of the 1950’s, re-emerged in the mid-1990’s and was then
relegated to the background following the events of September 11, 2001.
We are currently witnessing a diversification of the links between the
United States and China:
– strategically, China stands
out as the key Asian partner in issues that the United States considers
urgent, particularly in the negotiations on ending North Korea’s nuclear
programme. Moreover, the September 11, 2001 attacks have brought about a
rapprochement in Sino-American relations as the two seek ways to combat
terrorism: a dialogue on counter-terrorism has been entered into, and
China has spared no efforts to help with the reconstruction of
Afghanistan;
– in the field of economics, if
Sino-American trade is still well below transatlantic levels,
it is nevertheless increasing and becoming more complex, particularly
since China joined the World Trade Organisation in 2001. China is today
the United States’ main partner for trading in manufactured goods and is
responsible for 25% of the US commercial deficit (2003 figures). It was
this finding that triggered American requests to revalue the yen,
leading, in July 2005, to a modest rise of 2% in the Chinese currency.
During the Cold War, the United
States, acting within the framework of the Atlantic Pact, actively
supported the construction of Europe. To an extent it could even be said
that the establishment of the European Economic Community was born of
the Atlantic Alliance; in the fields of commerce and finance, American
support was linked to the emergence of a strong and united Europe to
help fend off the Soviet menace. Thus economic and strategic
considerations worked together to forge a benevolent attitude in the
United States towards the construction of Europe, especially as the
Europeans, by handing over responsibility for their defence to NATO,
accepted this unbalanced relationship.
The 1990’s marked a turning
point in the American stance – with the disappearance of their common
enemy, America became more ambivalent in its attitude to the process of
European unification. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification
of Germany gave renewed momentum to the construction of Europe,
investing it with a deeper meaning as well as extending it. Chancellor
Kohl lent his support to France’s proposal for an Intergovernmental
Conference (IGC) on the Economic and Monetary Union, which led in time
to the creation of a single currency, to which he succeeded in adding a
political union to create a true European Union. This opened the way to
extending European construction to areas that had long been off limits:
foreign policy and defence, areas tainted by the failure of the European
Defence Community in 1954 and then of the Fouchet plan in 1963.
It was against this background
that the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was born in 1992,
under the terms of the Maastricht treaty. It was severely tested by the
Balkan crisis in the 1990’s and was instrumental in alerting Europeans
to the futility of having a common foreign policy in the absence of any
common defence initiative. This realisation led to the Franco-British
summit in Saint-Malo in 1998, which saw the launch of a European
security and defence policy backed by proper operational resources.
The planned European
Constitutional Treaty was the most recent stage in the increasing power
of a politically united Europe; the refusal of France and of the
Netherlands will certainly hold back European construction for a time.
Moreover, the speed of the enlargement process throws into doubt the
prospect of the emergence of a political Europe. Be that as it may, this
remains the objective of a number of European countries, including
France.
While it is undeniable that the
United States never deliberately set out to divide Europe, it is equally
true that the American position on European construction has changed due
to the developments that have just been described. Just as, during the
Cold War, it was in America’s interests to encourage European
integration, today those interests seem less clear. The truth is that
the United States cannot decide on its position on Europe : should it
foster European disunity and disagreements (1) or lend its support to a
stronger, and therefore more structured Europe? (2)
(1) America needs a united
Europe to act as a stabilising influence, but will not accept a Europe
that presents a realistic challenge to its power. This is the
traditional view of transatlantic relations, a view currently held by
most of the American political establishment. There is here a surprising
paradox: the same people who are currently urging that traditional Cold
War structures be replaced by new ideas – preventive war, ad hoc
coalitions -, are those who, today in Washington, cling to a pattern of
transatlantic relations directly derived from the era of East-West
confrontation, that is, an alliance with a Europe that is economically
strong but politically weak and divided, dependent in military terms.
Within this perspective, European economic power could never lead to the
emergence of a political entity which might realistically compete with
the United States, while the acquisition of autonomous military capacity
would allow it to become strategically independent.
In this mindset the idea of a
European focus is unacceptable, as it is essentially incompatible with
the American quest for leadership – an aim not to be confused with
empire-building or domination.
There is implacable opposition
to the concept of a European focus, for the idea of a partner who would
decide its own strategic priorities and act accordingly is not
acceptable in this traditional perspective.
Consequently, any European
defence developments are regarded, if not with outright hostility, at
least with suspicion: the only acceptable advances are those which take
place in the context of strengthening the Atlantic Alliance, with
anything that exclusively serves the interests of European security and
defence policies being considered as tainted with ingratitude or
futility. The Atlantic Alliance is in fact considered to be the
“natural” forum for transatlantic political dialogue. It follows from
this that the United States are much more inclined to bring up
international security issues within the context of NATO than within
European institutions. The American attitude to the Atlantic Alliance is
indeed pervaded by this notion of leadership: if the United States feels
so much at home within this context, it is because NATO is the very
embodiment of this idea. Within a perspective of preserving American
superiority and prioritising American interests, NATO functions as a
centre in which American policy can be legitimised and its influence
increased: America the all-powerful carries out its NATO negotiations
from a position of strength, dealing with each European country on a
one-to-one, therefore unbalanced, basis.
(2) There is in the United
States another view of transatlantic relations apart from this
traditional one – a more pragmatic approach to relations between Europe
and the United States, which takes the view that within the strategic
context of the 21st century, if the US genuinely wants Europe
to be a strong ally, then Europe should be more than an economic giant,
but also a structured political entity. The supporters of this argument
– who are, it must be confessed, in the minority, understand that, given
the level of economic integration achieved by the countries of Europe,
any future progress in European construction will be of a political
nature. They are realistic enough to reflect that it is somewhat
outmoded for 298 million Americans to guarantee the security of 483
million Europeans
. They know that, within the logic of
increased European integration, the European Union will become the
preferred centre for transatlantic dialogue, to the detriment of NATO:
this means a new dialogue between two equally large and powerful
entities – at least in terms of population and the economy. This is a
far cry from the unbalanced exchanges within NATO, where the United
States is the de facto first among equals.
In a way, the neo-conservatives,
so roundly denounced in Europe, come into this category: what criticisms
can they level at Venus-like Europe, if not to say that it is
insufficiently powerful to help the United States fulfil their foreign
policy objectives? They maintain that it was American protection of
Europe during the Cold War that allowed European construction to
progress, by prioritising economic development and the establishment of
a highly protective social model; today they accuse Europe of clinging
to this blueprint, of prioritising the social model but neglecting to
take over where the US left off in terms of their own security, and of
failing to support the United States in its efforts to confront unrest
throughout the world.
The US administration is today
marked by these two approaches, as shown by each visit of the American
President to Europe. He automatically visits both NATO and the
institutions of the European Union. Against this background however,
NATO will probably remain the focus of transatlantic debate. This
reluctance on the part of the United States to engage with the European
Union can doubtless be explained by the complex structures of dialogue
between the two parties. There are in fact three levels of dialogue :
– an annual summit bringing
together the President of the United States, the President of the
European Union and the President of the Commission (joined by leading
figures from US trade, the Presidential office and the Commission);
– biannual consultations between
the Commission and the American administration, backed up by numerous
informal contacts, particularly on the periphery of major international
meetings (G7, WTO, IMF, World Bank);
– various working groups which
have evolved within the context of the new transatlantic agenda
established in 1995.
The deliberate choice, on the
part of the United States, to favour bilateral relations with member
States of the European Union is not consistent with the objectives of
American foreign policy. The United States cannot demand a coordinated
response to the challenges of our time while simultaneously favouring a
blueprint for a relationship with Europe as outmoded as it is unwieldy,
and moreover potentially ineffective. If the United States still seeks
co-ordination with its allies, rather than European fragmentation in the
name of a philosophy of an “à la carte” coalition, one strong Europe is
worth more than 25 separate States. Obviously the question of building
a political dialogue between the European Union and the United States is
a crucial one today.
Should Europe be an effective
ally, that is to say, better organised but conceivably in disagreement
with the United States, or an unconditional ally, automatically putting
support of the US above all other considerations, including its own
interests? We have already seen that the United States is not quite
ready to answer that question. The same goes for the Europeans, which
explains in part the current crisis within Europe: the European debate
on transatlantic relations is closely linked to the debate on the
identity of the Europe we are in the process of building. Indeed the
transatlantic partnership was the glue that held together the
construction of Europe during the Cold War. Now that we have an alliance
of choice rather than of necessity, what is the link between European
construction and the transatlantic bond? Should this bond remain one of
the pillars of the construction of Europe, which would imply a
particular European structure, with a pre-eminent role for NATO and
therefore a limited autonomy in political decision-making for Europe ?
Is it already a divisive force, as we have seen in Iraq, where certain
members of the Union put the transatlantic partnership above European
solidarity? Is it possible to build an effective Union that lacks
political or strategic autonomy? Asking this question leads us to
speculate about the relationship we wish to establish with this ally
who, during the Cold War, had replied in the affirmative to this
question, in full agreement with the Europeans.
The Iraq crisis has effectively
illuminated this question of identity: should we give primacy to
solidarity between European states or to the bilateral relationship each
one of them has with the United States? It exposed the fragilities that
certain people have not hesitated to over-simplify – consider, for
example, Mr Rumsfeld’s momentous slogan on “old Europe” and “new
Europe”. When one analyses these fragilities, however, they are more
complex than they appear.
Commentators in France routinely
denounce, openly or in veiled terms, the pro-Alliance stance of new
member States from the former Soviet bloc. It is undeniable that these
states have prioritised their relationship with the United States,
whether in speeches, through diplomatic channels, or in their choice of
military equipment. It would nevertheless be both inaccurate and
unhelpful to explain their preference for the Alliance as the result of
a partisan and non-negotiable ideological stance: to imply that after
enduring the rigours of the Soviet regime, they would gladly embrace
capitalism and ultra-liberalism, would be a caricature of the truth.
To be content with such a
simplistic analysis is to deny that these countries were politically
rational enough to make their foreign policy choices in pursuance of
their own interests. The high value that they place on their relations
with the United States, which can be measured for example by their
attachment to NATO, is the result of a dual analysis:
– Firstly, historic : no-one
would dispute that their experiences throughout the 20th
century have made them mistrustful of exclusively European alliances and
exchanges. Along with their Eastern neighbours, and indeed their
Western ones, these relationships cost them their independence, their
identity and their right to free expression.
– Their choice also rests
crucially on a contemporary geo-strategic analysis: the European Union,
and in particular the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is in
no position to offer them the guarantees on security that they have a
right to request.
Their attachment to the United
States, that is to say to American protection, is legitimate when one
considers their history; however, this is not necessarily a permanent
fixture of their political future. The commission noted during its visit
to NATO in Brussels that the Iraqi experience of these countries, like
their first steps in the European Union, led them to question certain
hopes and preconceived ideas that they may have held about both
entities. They are beginning to discover the price of loyalty, as well
as to gauge to what extent membership of the European Union can reduce
their influence. Poland in particular, which was involved in Iraq as
well as being highly active during the crisis in the Ukraine in December
2004, has experienced at first hand both NATO and European solidarities.
The Polish NATO representative spoke candidly to the commission about
how his country was discovering the limits of the first and the
advantages of the second.
Even though there is still work
to be done, the clash of the “old” and of the “new” Europe should not be
overstated: as new members become accustomed to the European
institutions, the old divisions and prejudices should become blurred, on
condition, of course, that we long-standing Member States, but also we
French, abandon our own prejudices.
Moreover, the contradictions
within Europe on what position to adopt with regard to the United
States, for from being merely a two-sided rift within the Union, are
common in most European countries:
– Great Britain, a faithful ally of the United
States, saw the largest demonstrations against American intervention in
Iraq, underpinned by public opinion largely hostile to American foreign
policy. Let us remember too that Great Britain is one of the
instigators and pillars of the European Security and Defence Policy.
An even more acute symptom of these contradictions is
the position of Germany, who for several years has been working on a
large-scale, though low-key project to redefine its transatlantic
policy. In February 2005, Chancellor Schroeder spoke at an annual
meeting of European and American leaders and experts, convened in Munich
to discuss strategic issues, and his speech revealed both the extent and
the radicalism of German self-questioning. It was the first time that a
German leader had publicly declared that NATO is no longer the preferred
venue for transatlantic debate: the German authorities, however,
subsequently beat a retreat and failed to translate their words into
actions, as many leading German players, particularly in the foreign
affairs and defence ministries, still feel a powerful attraction to the
Atlantic Alliance.
In reality, Germany remains what it has always been
in the scheme of transatlantic relations: a pillar of NATO, highly
visible in logistic and material terms, but with a history of discretion
in political debates. The fact remains that, even if the Chancellor’s
speech of February 2005 was just testing the water and produced no
concrete results, Germany’s doubts go very deep: Chancellor Schroeder’s
“discreetly anti-American” conviction, as reported by Der Spiegel
on the occasion of President Bush’s visit of February 2005, reflects the
fact that the German public feels a growing sense of disquiet towards
the United States - a fundamental trend that is not easily reversible.
Whatever political developments may ensue in Germany, they will not
avert this slow re-positioning of the country, a consequence of the fall
of the Berlin Wall and of reunification, which has taken it from the
most traditional pro-Atlantic Alliance position to a growing affirmation
of its commitment to Europe.
– The examples of Spain and Italy are equally
interesting, because they are a clear illustration that the attitude to
America in these countries is closely linked to internal political
developments. Under José María Aznar, Spain placed its relationship with
the United States at the top of the scale of foreign policy priorities;
after the attacks of 11 March 2004 and the election of a new government,
there was a seismic shift in policy. The same can be said of Italy,
which is currently pursuing a highly pro-Atlantic Alliance policy.
In all, while there is undoubtedly a European
consensus in many areas – the fight against terrorism, the International
Criminal Tribunal, non-proliferation, the emergence of China, the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, not to mention the existence of the “Kyoto
people”, which brings together Europeans and Russians -, it is equally
true that the relationship each European Union Member State has with the
United States is anything but neutral. There is nothing automatic about
European solidarity: on the issues which might lead to differences of
opinion with the United States, it is virtually impossible that
Europeans might rally around a common position. The recent controversy
on the lifting of the embargo on arms sales to China by the European
Union, on which France and Great Britain spontaneously agreed, acted as
a reminder of the fear still engendered by a threat of reprisals from
the United States. The British Presidency therefore abandoned the
project.
For the moment, the contradictions of Europe are
stronger than the desire for co-ordination, which is a problem for the
transatlantic relationship itself. All the prominent people heard by the
commission emphasised this: there can be no improvement in relations
between the European Union and the United States until there is some
unity of European perspectives. Just as, when the only watchword was an
unwavering solidarity, the Cold War model was effective, now when we
discuss defence, the economy, commercial relations, monetary or
environmental issues, etc, a policy, that is to say, a set of objectives
within a structured and coherent discourse, should be established.
The necessity for such a structure is all the more
pressing given that the United States, in pursuit of their vision of
international politics, are today asking some burning questions. For
example, when the United States launch a debate on the democratisation
of the Arab-Islamist world, such questions cannot be dismissed as
adventurism. Certainly, its undoubted power makes them less likely to
accept established situations and more inclined to act as the Pygmalion
of international relations, especially as this power rests on a
messianic tradition that is an integral part of the American psyche.
However this finding does not excuse European passivity nor failure to
respond, especially as several European countries, notably France which
has the highest number of French citizens and residents of the Islamic
faith in Europe, have launched a national debate on the subject, asking
questions on the link between Islam and its own democratic model, which
happens to be the republican model. It is plain that for a subject so
sensitive, and so crucial to the future of many countries, some of them
among our closest allies, the European Union must engage fully with the
issue, and not let the Atlantic Alliance, a military instrument, have
exclusive rights to the debate.
Many subjects of interest to both Europe and the
United States go far beyond the context of the Atlantic Alliance and are
so important that they require, on the European side, a unity of views,
that is to say the involvement of the European Union. This is the core
of the debate launched by the German Chancellor in February 2005 on what
would be the most suitable forum for transatlantic discussions. The
current attempts by the NATO Secretary General, responding to the German
statement, to reform the process of dialogue within NATO, only serves to
strengthen the German position.
Transatlantic security relationships have three
outstanding features:
– the disconnection between defence of America’s
vital interests and NATO intervention;
– the rise of extra-European dangers and threats;
– the European demonstration of their ability to make
the ESDP work in European and non-European theatres, in some cases using
NATO resources.
Symbol and pillar of the Cold War transatlantic
agreement, the Atlantic Alliance is primarily concerned with this new
state of affairs and obviously bears the brunt of these tectonic
movements – tectonic because slow and inevitable, though marked by
crises and accelerations – at work as the agreement is redefined. In it
are concentrated all the various American and European ambiguities and
contradictions, to the extent that it is very difficult today to define
the precise nature and role of this Alliance. This is hardly news: if
the history of the Alliance is mainly the history of its crises,
it is also a history of contradictions and ambiguities. These are in
fact an integral part of its identity, for it has always been defined by
asymmetry and imbalance.
In fulfilling the agreement set for it, the Atlantic
Alliance found itself, at the end of the Cold War, faced with the
question of its raison d’être. The adoption of a new strategic
concept in 1999, at the Washington summit, and the current reform of its
structure and its intervention methods are supposed to have supplied an
answer to the question of the Alliance’s role.
THE NATO STRATEGIC
CONCEPT
The NATO Strategic
Concept is the official statement of the Alliance’s aims and
supplies, at the highest level, advice on the political and military
means of achieving them. Four concepts have been adopted since the
Alliance was founded: in 1949-1950, in 1967, in 1991 and in 1999.
At the Washington
summit, in 1999, the NATO countries effectively approved a new
Strategic Concept destined to allow the Alliance to respond to
problems of security and to eventualities which might arise in the
21st century, as well as to guide its future political
and military development.
The updated Strategic
Concept offers general directives for drawing up policies and
detailed military plans. It describes the purpose and the duties of
the Alliance and examines its strategic perspectives in the light of
the evolving strategic environment, as well as risks and challenges
in the area of security. Presenting the Alliance’s approach to
security in the 21st century, the Concept reaffirms the
importance of the transatlantic link and of the maintenance of the
Alliance’s military capabilities, and examines the role of other
essential elements in its overall approach to security and
stability, namely the European security and defence identity,
conflict prevention and management of crises, the Partnership,
co-operation and dialogue, enlargement, arms control, disarmament
and non-proliferation. Finally, the concept provides indications of
future directions for the forces of the Alliance, founded on the
principles of Alliance strategy and its military apparatus. The last
section deals with missions of the Alliance’s military forces and
with future directions for these, as well as features of
conventional and nuclear forces.
However, the commission does not
share this view and after hearing the main French leaders speak on the
subject, as well as visiting NATO headquarters in Brussels, has been
struck by the complete confusion reigning in this regard.
It has not received a
satisfactory response to the one question that really counts: what is
the nature of NATO today? Is it destined to do, in Afghanistan, Kosovo,
and Bosnia, what the UN did in Namibia, Cambodia or Mozambique, that is,
to act as military back-up after the conflict? Is it a pool of men and
equipment for the use of ad hoc coalitions established by the United
States ? An instrument of support and political legitimacy for the
benefit of the United States ? A vehicle for the modernisation of
European defence forces ? How can NATO remain effective if it has to
intervene in the theatres of the “South”, while preserving its treaty
role as defender of Europe?
In short, since the end of the
Cold War, the fundamental debate on NATO’s raison d’être has been
replaced by multiple debates on the reform of its structures or its
geographical limits. The question remains, however, in a context in
which two diametrically opposed visions of NATO’s role are pitted
against each other:
– a traditional vision, which
makes the Alliance a military instrument for the defence of Europe
against external threats or against the danger of internal
destabilisation within the continent of Europe;
– an innovative vision, which
sees in NATO a security apparatus in the service of the democratic
Western world, with military, political and diplomatic capabilities, and
intervening throughout the world, according to the foreign policy
priorities of its members.
It is
difficult today to determine which of these concepts will prevail, given
that the various NATO members have such widely divergent visions of the
Alliance. Without exaggeration, NATO in 2005 is an unidentified
strategic instrument.
Let us
admit that the American position on NATO does nothing to dispel the
current confusion. The expression “American position” is in any case
largely inaccurate, since there are today in the United States not one
but three separate policies on NATO: the State Department is focused on
the political dimension of the Atlantic Alliance, with NATO acting as an
authority for the legitimisation of actions outside the United States;
then there is the view of the American integrated military structure,
which seeks to preserve the operational link between American and
European forces, and concentrates on reforms intended to make NATO into
a functional military instrument, whatever its missions might be;
finally, the Pentagon regards NATO as just another tool in the service
of American policy.
In one
way, the Pentagon’s position is the clearest, summed up in the American
Defence Secretary’s already quoted phrase, according to which “the
mission makes the coalition”.
According to this notion, NATO’s collective defence mission is obsolete:
when it was considering its response to the September 11, 2001 attacks,
which had been prepared in Afghanistan, the Pentagon never once
seriously considered the option of a NATO intervention based on the
activation of article 5 as proposed by the European allies. NATO is now
used mainly in peacekeeping missions when the Pentagon wants to avoid
mobilising too many American troops. Moreover this was the ministerial
department which pressed for a disengagement of American troops in
Europe and a reduction in the number of troops in the Balkans.
In
this perspective, the objective is no longer even interoperability but
at best complementarity of American and European forces, the latter
being seen in any case as insufficient in number. This is why only 8% of
American forces can be assigned to NATO missions, a figure which after
the current restructuring process, could fall to 3%. In this
perspective, the Alliance is just a kind of military “Windows”, that is,
it functions like a computer program to facilitate the functioning of
the American and European armies on the limited occasions when they
would be called upon to act together.
Be
that as it may, NATO is in the eyes of the US a useful but peripheral
instrument. Today NATO is less important in military terms for the
United States than for France – while in political terms the reverse is
true: the first uses this channel in a very limited way militarily, to
the extent that even in Afghanistan where there is a NATO presence, they
maintain the ad hoc operation Enduring Freedom – which they would
like to merge with the NATO operation; France for her part has many
troops under NATO command, whether in Kosovo or in Afghanistan.
The NATO military authorities who spoke to the commission in Brussels
admitted that the interoperability
of Alliance American forces with European forces was in decline and that
their complementarity, a term more appropriate to the current situation,
was also reduced. This is an astonishing statement, which speaks volumes
on the depth of the difference of opinion between Europeans, whose most
pressing question is how to maintain the United States’ commitment to
Europe, and Americans, who are concentrating their efforts largely on
extra-European matters…
As
with the United States, it is difficult to pin down the unity of German
policy on NATO. As pointed out earlier, two tendencies co-exist in
Germany, even if the only official policy remains the traditional
pro-Alliance line. Represented, for example by the transatlantic
relations coordinator and the NATO permanent representation, this
policy, a legacy of the Cold War, sees the imbalance between Europeans
and Americans in NATO as permanent and intrinsic to the very nature of
the Alliance. So, lacking a serious alternative capable of fulfilling
the function of collective defence of the Alliance, the traditional
transatlantic link should be preserved whatever the cost, even if that
cost is European subordination.
The
United Kingdom, together with the new member States, is undoubtedly the
partner with the clearest vision on NATO. Its vision is
characteristically pragmatic : as the Atlantic Alliance is the most
dependable method of maintaining the link between Europe and the United
States, it should be maintained and even strengthened, whatever its
mission. The British consider moreover that the issue of NATO missions
is secondary, focusing instead on the political role of the Alliance:
they emphasise the permanent nature of the centre for dialogue and for
transatlantic political consultations, unlike the dialogue between the
European Union and the United States, which only happens when the two
entities hold a summit. By this reasoning, the indisputable British
support for the ESDP should not be interpreted as an ambiguous element
of the British position, even if, to persuade their American allies to
accept the ESDP, the British used very subtle arguments, carefully
judged according to whether they were dealing with the French or the
Americans. According to the British perspective, the ESDP has one
purpose: to strengthen NATO, so as to satisfy the American desire for a
functioning and effective military instrument.
As for
the new member States, far from reflecting on the interest of military
operations outside the Alliance’s sphere of influence
, which is known as the “out-zone”, and
on the politicisation of the Alliance, they want to see in it the
traditional instrument of Alliance collective defence. If they take part
in other Alliance missions and even support the United States in ad hoc
coalitions which marginalise the Alliance, it is only to prove that they
are model allies, in the hope that should their security, even their
very existence, be threatened, the lessons of the past will not be
repeated.
What,
finally, can be said about France’s position on the Alliance? It must be
acknowledged that France is not necessarily keen to dispel the
uncertainties that plague the Alliance. In her defence, however, we can
say that this ambiguity is voluntary and that France takes full
responsibility for it. In fact there is an extraordinary discrepancy
between the French stated position on the Alliance and the reality of
its action:
– The
French position remains as it was in 1966, when General de Gaulle
decided that France would leave the integrated military structure.
Fervent defender and activist of the ESDP, France cultivates its special
place within the Alliance, making sure that all topics raised there are
carefully examined so that priority is given to our foreign policy in
general, and our European policy in particular: suspicion of the
“out-zone”, refusal to establish the Alliance, whether in the long or
medium term, as a favoured centre of transatlantic dialogue on major
security matters, refusal of any decision which might a priori
restrict the ESDP’s room for manoeuvre, now and in the future.
– In
practice however, France is both highly active and highly visible within
the Alliance, in all fields: political, operational, military and
administrative.
With
more than 4000 men in the service of NATO, whether in Bosnia, where the
European Union has virtually taken over from NATO since December 2004,
in Kosovo, in Afghanistan, or within the Rapid Reaction Force, France is
the second largest contributor to NATO forces.
In
financial terms, France provides 14.78% of the civil budget and 13.85%
of the military budget, which makes it the fourth largest contributor in
the Alliance. Moreover, through its high level of involvement in the
Rapid Response Force (NRF), France now participates in the operating
budget of certain Chiefs of Staff and entities of the integrated
military structure.
In
addition, France has a presence in the Alliance command structure, and
it is actively participating in its current reform. The former NATO
command structure was based on a geographic distribution of
responsibilities: one command for allied forces in Europe (SACEUR, in
Mons, Belgium) and an Atlantic command (SACLANT, in Norfolk, United
States). The new structure, approved at the Prague summit of 21 and 22
November 2002, is based on a functional distribution: an operational
command (SACO, in Mons), responsible for all Alliance operations: and a
functional command (SACT, in Norfolk) responsible for the transformation
of NATO.
Strictly speaking, France is not involved in the command structure.
Until 2004, however, it had about 50 soldiers “embedded” in this
structure because of its participation in Alliance operations.
Immediately afterwards and in accordance with the Prague summit, to
enhance its participation in the transformation of NATO, France decided
to strengthen its position by assigning another fifty soldiers to the
new structure :
–
firstly, to the Allied Command Operations (ACO), for posts linked to the
NRF
;
– for
posts linked to the reform of doctrines and the training of Alliance
forces, to the Allied Command Transformation (ACT).
In
addition, in May 2004, France assigned a general officer to each of
these two commands.
There
will therefore be a total of roughly one hundred French soldiers
“embedded” in the command structure. For purposes of comparison, the
command structure comprises almost 12,000 soldiers, of whom the United
States supplies 2,800, Germany 2,500 and Italy 1,200.
So
while it is a fact that France has not changed its specific position, in
the sense that it retains control of its forces’ engagement, including
the Response Force, and that its participation in what was, before the
reform of the command, an integrated military structure, is not
complete, it must be stated that it is highly visible in NATO’s military
structure, and in positions of importance - command positions linked to
the NRF. The creation, in October 2005, of the Rapid Reaction
Force-France Headquarters (QG CRR-FR) speaks of France’s involvement in
the NRF, and thus in a broader sense, of her role in the Alliance, as
the NRF is destined to become the allies’ principal instrument of
intervention. Today, France’s only notable absence is in the planning
entities – the Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning
Group.
While the history of
transatlantic relations has been subject to frequent crises, it is
however the first time that tension between a part of Europe and the
United States, over the debate on intervention in Iraq, has led to a
questioning of the validity of the community of values between the two
partners. On both sides of the Atlantic, the idea has taken root of a
deep division between peoples, going far beyond personal differences
between the American President and some of his European partners.
It is appropriate here to leave
clichés and polemics behind and to concentrate on realities. These lead
us to much more nuanced conclusions, certainly revealing major
differences in sensibility between Europeans and Americans, but equally,
in day-to-day relations, illuminating a partnership which has never been
as strong in the history of transatlantic relations, made up of a
complex web of connections. A partnership which, whatever happens, has
no equivalent elsewhere in the world and remains, even in a context of
diverse and multiple threats, necessary for international security and
stability.
Do the United States and Europe
now belong to two different worlds ? The debate on the transatlantic
link sometimes comes adrift on a debate relating to the survival of the
community of values between the two continents: history, geography,
culture and economy are used to evoke a pessimistic vision of two
societies with radically different concerns and perspectives.
If these rather excessive
comments conceal either profound mutual ignorance or an ideological bias
useful for internal politics, their success is nevertheless easily
explained. They are based on a truth that the sacred union against a
common enemy during the Cold War, under the unifying banner of “Western
world” has made us forget: the United States is not an American
extension of Europe, but a nation with a clear identity of its own.
There is nothing new here: both the history and the geography of the
United States have forged a body of values which belong only to them.
The primacy of the individual, suspicion of any intervention by the
federal State but visceral attachment to the Nation, the acceptance of
the use of force, the messianic ethos of a nation which sees itself as a
new promised land, the high level of religious practice, etc.: no need
to emphasise how, in a Europe which values social cohesion and the role
of the State, which is terrified of nationalism, and allergic to the use
of armed force, American values are perceived as radically alien. Once
again we realise that the geo-strategic position of the United States,
more insular and distant, tends to favour a culture of long-distance
intervention and a more unilateral style – let us note however that this
geographical factor is not in itself sufficient to explain the American
attitude, as the contrasting example of Canada shows; by contrast too,
European Union countries have developed a culture of engagement, linked
to the proximity of the problems they have to deal with, and a
multilateral style. This explains why we are again faced with
stereotypes of the order of “European appeasement versus American
force”.
These differences are obviously
not new, indeed, they are fundamental to the American identity. However,
what is new is how keenly these differences, masked to some extent
during the Cold War, are felt. The undeniable fact is that whatever the
differences of identity between Europeans and Americans, they have been
exacerbated by recent developments on both sides of the Atlantic.
At the risk of stating the
obvious, the United States has changed. There is a structural phenomenon
at work here: the United States is less interested in Europe because
Europe is increasingly absent from the mental landscape of Americans.
The demographic factor
Demographic changes in the
United States have a key role to play in this respect. The section of
the American population that originates from Europe is constantly
falling. A profound change is taking place in American society, one that
has prompted much soul-searching in the United States itself. In a
recent work, Professor Samuel Huntington asks Who are we?,
a sometimes provocative analysis of the end of the domination of
traditional Anglo-Saxon protestant values in the United States.
Logically, the fact that Europe is no longer the focus of special
attention there stems from the continuing growth of the non-European
section of the population.
The United States today
continues its long tradition of welcoming immigrants, taking in more
than any other country; since the 1970’s, the United States has
experienced an unprecedented wave of immigration, exceeding even that at
the start of the twentieth century. In 2005, 32.5 million American
residents were born abroad, that is 11.5 % of the total population. Only
a small proportion of these immigrants are European – the population of
the United States is more strikingly racially diverse than ever. In
recent years, Latin Americans and racial minority groups (that is,
racial and ethnic groups which make up less than 50% of the population,
including non-Hispanic coloureds, Asians and Native Americans) have
shown a demographic growth above that of the total population. In 1970,
these groups together represented a mere 16% of the population. In 1998,
their share had reached 27%. Working on the hypothesis that these
tendencies are set to continue, the Federal Census Bureau predicts that
by 2050 they will account for almost half of the population of the
United States: the Hispanic population should reach 103 million – one
quarter of the population - in 2050, the African-American population 61
million, and the Asian population 33 million.
Although they are by definition
imprecise, these projections indicate that the United States will
experience a significant increase in racial and ethnic diversity during
this century.
In 2004, the ten countries with
the highest number of legal immigrants (946,142 in total) were: Mexico
with 175,364, India (70,116), the Philippines (57,827), China (51,156),
Vietnam (31,514), Dominican Republic (30,492), El Salvador (29,795),
Cuba (20,488), Korea (19,766), and Colombia (18,678). Compared with the
127,669 European immigrants to American soil in that same year, these
figures are highly significant.
The growth in the number of
Asian and Latin American immigrants noted during recent decades is in
essence due to a change in immigration policy. In particular, the law of
1965 ended the system of quotas based on national origin, which
restricted immigration from non-European countries. Similarly, the law
of 1986 relating to the reform and control of immigration contributed to
the increase in the number of Asian and Latin American immigrants,
because many illegals took advantage of the new measures to have their
papers put in order. It should be mentioned here that numbers of illegal
immigrants, estimated at 3.5 million in 1990, are today thought to be
9.3 million, two thirds of whom are of Mexican origin. The rise of these
ethnic groups is further strengthened by falling fertility levels in all
non-Latin American sectors of the population. Consequently, the number
of white people not of Latin American origin has been falling since
1970, while the number of African-Americans has risen only slightly.
If the demographic variable will
probably strongly influence the development of transatlantic relations –
in this case as a factor contributing to alienation – this also stems
from the fact that the American centre of gravity has moved towards the
West and the South. It is these States that stand to gain the most from
demographic growth: in 2030 they will make up 65% of the population of
America, compared with 59% today. The personal journey of President
George W. Bush himself, a Texan by adoption from a New England family,
is indicative of this change.
Post September 11, 2001 – changes in America
This change did not become
apparent in the post-Cold War period, due to continuing security
problems in Europe. The reality of these findings hits home today. They
were revealed by the attacks of September 11, 2001, which reinvigorated
traditional American values, especially as the Republican Party had been
in power since its victory in the legislative elections of 1994.
We must be clear about the
timing of this: the changes were already taking place before September
11, as already, since the Clinton era, multilateral treaties were being
challenged, (rejection of the ban on nuclear testing treaty, constant
attacks on the ABM Treaty….), and American national interests were being
prioritised, sometimes to the extent of challenging basic principles of
international law. It was also before the September 11 attacks that the
ideas promoted by neo-conservatives, whose origins can be traced to a
reaction against the egalitarian and anti-establishment culture of
1960’s America, became seriously influential in the world of American
politics. Moreover, in 1996, the neo-conservative movement had published
its manifesto, which includes some major preoccupations since the year
2000 – refusal to accept a decline in American power, upgrading of the
military instrument, promotion of a benevolent American hegemony.
It would therefore seem that the
tragic events of September 11 acted as a catalyst, not awakening these
values but mobilising them.
September 11 did not invent
American patriotism: there has always been a significant reserve of
patriotism and nationalism in the United States, and September 11 and
the preparation for intervention in Iraq acted to focus and intensify
these sentiments. This was a process that gave rise to some strange
alliances in the American political landscape, as a second result of
September 11 had been to unite diverse political movements around these
traditional values. To take the most revealing example, the alliance
between neo-conservatives – who were mostly far-left intellectuals – and
Christian fundamentalists – to the right of the Republican party, with
occasional hints of anti-Semitism – was very far from being natural.
This rallying around traditional
American values can in reality be analysed not as a change, but a return
to the source. Unilateralism is a long-established tradition in America,
and the period of history stretching from Roosevelt to the end of the
Cold War can be seen, in the long term, as a mere parenthesis in
American history. To an extent, what is happening at the moment is that
Europe is re-discovering the real America. It is important to
understand this, so that we can avoid any vague desire to pursue the
completely unattainable objective of a return to the atmosphere of the
1950’s. “You are dealing with the last generation of Americans who
have a sentimental approach to Europe”
Kissinger told the Europeans in the
1970’s. Recent years have underlined how prescient his little joke was.
The specific nature of American
identity stands out even more, given that Europe was also changing at
the same time. So, while the 1990’s was marked by a great ideological
renaissance in the United States, in Europe it will be remembered as
marking a major withdrawal from ideological debates and the progressive,
even laborious acquisition of a fully European political consciousness.
Similarly, at the very moment when the United States, having suffered an
attack on their own soil, re-affirmed their sovereignty, even at the
risk of clashing with the rules of international law, Europe since the
Maastricht treaty entered a “post-Sovereign” era. There is no doubt that
these contrasting developments will tend to favour, on the European
side, a more acute perception of the changes at work in the United
States.
Although differences between
American and European sensibilities remain significant and unchanging,
they do not call into question the fellowship of ideas unequalled
elsewhere in the world, a fellowship uniting them on fundamental issues.
We should point this out more often: North America – the United States
and Canada – and Europe are the only places in the world that have the
same approach to the universal values of respect for fundamental human
rights and the principle of a social structure based on democracy,
rather than on a theocracy or a dictatorship. Certainly the United
States has its own specific legal system, but no one could dispute the
fact that Europeans and Americans share the conviction that the only
legitimate source of power lies in the people or their representatives –
a conviction and a practice not exactly widespread in the world. The
data gleaned from the most recent survey carried out by the German
Marshall Fund are encouraging : 74% of Europeans feel that the
European Union should help to establish democracy in other countries;
51% of Americans are of the same opinion about their own country, a
figure which rises to 76% among Republican supporters. Similarly,
regarding basic human rights, there is a profound consensus.
Recent debates on the fellowship
of transatlantic values have also focused on the subject of religion,
echoing the biblical rhetoric often used by the President of the United
States. Here again, we should not give much credence to the frequently
prejudiced analyses on the place of religion in the United States. There
is absolutely no doubt that Americans are deeply religious and that
religion looms large in the United States, including in public life. We
French should however be careful to remember that our own views on the
place of religion in society, informed by the principle of secularism,
are quite unique to us. In this matter it is we who are the exceptions,
even within Europe. Moreover, the relationship between Americans and
religion is more complex than some commentators allow. Also, how many
people are aware that, in the context of the French legal ban on
religious symbols in schools, tolerated unless they are worn with an
intention to proselytise, a judgment of the American Supreme Court
strictly forbids all external religious symbols in the army?
Similarly, despite the purely
French debates on “ultra-liberalism”, France along with its European
partners shares with the United States the same economic model – the
market economy, based on freedom of trade and commerce. On the world
stage, the constant attacks on the UN in a section of the American
political establishment will not make us forget that in Europe as in the
United States, we consider it necessary to structure international life
around principles and institutions which guarantee world stability and
security.
Far removed from apocalyptic
comments on the chasm separating European and American values, we cannot
but be struck by the conclusion that we share a profound fellowship of
ideas, borne out in many surveys. Is it necessary to point out that
Europe and the United States are perceived as one entity in the rest of
the world: in fact it is the shared values of democracy and the market
economy that differentiate Europe and the United States from the rest of
the world, for out of the 6.5 billion people on the planet, fewer than
two billion benefit from these. Even if people in Cairo or Buenos Aires
know that American policy on the Middle East conflict or on development
aid is different from European Union policy, the European-American
fellowship of ideas on fundamental values is perceived as is
